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The Cultural Dynamics of Rewarding  
Honesty and Punishing Deception
Cynthia S. Wang1 and Angela K.-y. Leung2
Abstract
Recent research suggests that individuals reward honesty more than they punish deception. Five experiments showed 
that different patterns of rewards and punishments emerge for North American and East Asian cultures. Experiment 1 
demonstrated that Americans rewarded more than they punished, whereas East Asians rewarded and punished in equivalent 
amounts. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that these divergent patterns by culture could be explained by greater social mobility 
experienced by Americans. Experiments 4 and 5 examined how certain consequences of social mobility, approach–avoidance 
behavioral motivations and trust and felt obligation, can lead to disparate reward and punishment decisions within the two 
cultures. Moreover, Experiment 4 revealed that Americans exhibited stronger evaluative reactions toward deception but 
stronger behavioral intentions toward honesty; East Asians did not exhibit this evaluative–behavioral asymmetry. The cross-
cultural implications for understanding rewards and punishments in an increasingly globalized world are discussed.
Keywords
reward, punishment, honesty, deception, culture, social mobility
Received September 12, 2009; revision accepted June 10, 2010
Collective benefits often accrue from rewarding good behav-
ior and punishing bad behavior. Research has compared 
how people punish deception and reward honesty (Abbink, 
Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2000; Offerman, 2002) and suggested 
that people punish more than they reward because negative 
events psychologically outweigh positive events (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). This assumption 
has been recently challenged by Wang, Galinsky, and 
Murnighan (2009), who resolved methodological issues in 
previous research and consistently found the opposite pattern: 
Individuals rewarded honesty more frequently and intensely 
than they punished deception. 
However, these findings by Wang et al. were limited to 
American samples, with minimal consideration for a more 
expansive global scope. If individuals from different cultures 
reward and punish in different manners, clashes of expecta-
tions might be predictable in intercultural contexts. A promi-
nent example of cultures colliding over the acceptability of 
punishment is the 1994 caning of Michael Fay, a U.S. teen-
ager who was charged with vandalizing public property in 
Singapore. The ruling sparked outrage from the United States, 
culminating in U.S. President Bill Clinton calling the pun-
ishment excessive and requesting clemency. Many Singa-
poreans were disgruntled with the United States’s attempt to 
intervene, noting that Singapore, as a sovereign state, could 
use its own discretion in extending punishments. This example 
suggests that understanding the dynamics behind punishing 
deception and rewarding honesty within different cultures 
may ultimately be essential in reducing misinterpretations and 
misconceptions between cultures.
This article suggests that patterns of reward and punish-
ment differ within certain cultures: The present experiments 
retest whether Americans reward more than they punish (e.g., 
Wang et al., 2009) and test whether East Asians (i.e., ethnic 
Chinese: Taiwanese, Singaporean Chinese,1 and Hong Kong 
Chinese) reward and punish in relatively equivalent amounts. 
We explain these comparatively disparate levels of reward 
and punishment within each culture using the theoretical 
framework of social mobility. Drawing from recent research 
studying the effects of social mobility (Chen, Chiu, & Chan, 
2009; Oishi, 2010; Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, & Takemura, 
2009), we propose that the different levels of mobility prevalent 
in different cultures encourage disparate reactions to dece p-
tion and honesty. These reactions are related to individuals’ 
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evaluations of and behavioral intentions toward deceptive 
and honest actors, as well as certain psychological motives 
(trust and felt obligation) that arise from differences in social 
mobility.
Cultural Differences in Mobility
Countries vary in the degree to which their people are mobile. 
In general, individuals in highly mobile countries have rela-
tively loose relationship boundaries in which they can easily 
enter into and exit from a relationship (i.e., high relational 
mobility; Schug et al., 2009; Yuki et al., 2007), a job (i.e., 
high job mobility; Yuki et al., 2007), or a residence (i.e., high 
residential mobility; Oishi, 2010; Oishi & Kisling, 2009). 
Research also suggested that Americans tend to be more 
mobile than East Asians (e.g., those from Japan and China; 
Chen et al., 2009; Schug et al., 2009; Yuki et al., 2007). This 
experience with or perception of social mobility may encour-
age different psychological responses, which in turn may pro-
duce different patterns of reward and punishment, both in 
terms of comparing between East Asian and North American 
cultures and comparing within each culture.
Felt Obligation and Punishment 
As relationships in mobile cultures tend to be more transient 
than relationships in stable cultures (Whyte, 1956), an increased 
importance is placed on the personal self, rather than collec-
tive self (Oishi, 2010; Oishi, Lun, & Sherman, 2007). With 
less structural constraint and an increased self-focus in West-
ern cultures, relationships are tied with less collective duties 
and responsibilities (Ho, Rousseau, & Levesque, 2006). Within 
this less dependent social structure, the effect of an individual’s 
negative act may be less likely to spill over to related others 
in the form of collective culpability; Westerners, therefore, 
feel less obligated to deliver punishment to deter further mis-
conduct. When misconduct does happen, individuals can avoid 
wrongdoers because of their less binding social network, thus 
sparing the use of punishment. Past findings by Wang et al. 
(2009) support the theorizing that Americans feel less obli-
gated to punish and therefore want to avoid deceptive actors 
instead.
East Asian cultures’ less mobile society entails a type of 
social network that is generally more tight-knit, and therefore, 
relationships always come with more obligations and respon-
sibilities (Ho et al., 2006). In East Asia, the responsibility 
for negative acts appears to “ripple” over to people who are 
not directly connected to these negative episodes (see Chao, 
Zhang, & Chiu, 2008; Maddux & Yuki, 2006). For example, 
in one study, Japanese and American participants read a food 
poisoning case that occurred in a school context. Though 
participants did not differ by culture by the amount of blame 
they assigned to the cook, Japanese participants were more 
likely than American participants to hold the school and the 
principal responsible for contaminating the food (Zemba, 
Young, & Morris, 2006). This illustrates two sides of the same 
story: First, less mobile individuals have to be vigilant of 
malevolent acts that can be truly consequential within an 
interconnected group of people in a close-knit network; sec-
ond, they risk collective punishment if they fail to keep trou-
blemakers within bounds via punishments. Together, these 
two forces invoke extensive relational obligations to curtail 
malfeasance (Fukuyama, 1995; Miller & Kanazawa, 2000), 
with those deviating from the existing collective order pun-
ished for their wrongdoing. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that 
punishments are viewed as a socially wise and legitimate incen-
tive in less mobile societies with interlocking res ponsibilities; 
therefore, East Asians may be more ready than Americans to 
use punishments to help maintain social order. 
Trust and Reward
Although a mobile environment can afford people the option 
to avoid dishonest actors given the relative ease of exiting 
from problematic relationships, it also provides them with 
the option to choose whom they want to approach. Notably, 
because more mobile individuals tend to interact with strang-
ers, whom they know little about, it is important for them to 
develop the ability to identify, form, and maintain positive 
relationships with these strangers (Macy & Sato, 2002). In 
particular, individuals in more mobile cultures are actively 
inclined to seek out positive relationships with trustworthy 
actors, as working with trustworthy people can help them 
flourish and minimize the opportunity of being cheated. In 
contrast, in less mobile cultures, individuals do not encoun-
ter strangers as frequently and may tend to avoid transactions 
with unrelated and potentially untrustworthy outsiders. Instead, 
they would prefer to interact with close kin, neighbors, and 
friends whom they have come to trust over time (Macy & 
Sato, 2002; Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, in press).
As a result, individuals from highly mobile societies, 
such as those from an American culture, might more readily 
recognize and trust a stranger’s honest act than individuals 
from a less mobile society, such as those from East Asian 
cultures. Research supports this proposition, with highly 
mobile Americans exhibiting greater trust toward strangers 
who have acted in a trustworthy manner than less mobile 
East Asians (Brewer, 1981; Fukuyama, 1995; Yuki, Maddux, 
Brewer, & Takemura, 2005). 
It is also important that not only are highly mobile indi-
viduals incentivized to recognize signs of trustworthiness, 
they are also motivated to act on their trust, as social rela-
tionships with those outside one’s immediate family or kin-
ship network have to be cultivated (Macy & Sato, 2002; 
Schug et al., in press). One way of cultivating a positive social 
relationship is by rewarding individuals who have acted in 
a trustworthy manner. Indeed, findings by Wang et al. 
(2009) support the link between trust and reward: Increased 
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trustworthiness of honest actors encourages rewards, but 
decreased trustworthiness of deceptive actors does not 
amplify punishments, implying that high (low) generalized 
trust may help explain higher (lower) levels of rewards by 
Americans (East Asians).
All in all, we contend that outside the confines of a closely 
knit relationship in a highly mobile environment, Americans, 
compared to East Asians: (a) can avoid dishonest persons in 
their social circle more easily; they thus feel less obligated to 
closely monitor each other and, in turn, will punish dishon-
esty less, and (b) can approach honest persons more easily; 
they are more trusting of honest strangers and are more incen-
tivized to strengthen positive relationships with relationally 
distant honest actors and, in turn, will reward honesty more. 
Together, the present research hypothesizes that Americans 
will reward more than they punish (as shown by Wang et al., 
2009); however, because of heightened obligation to punish 
deceptive individuals and lowered generalized trust of hon-
est individuals, the difference between punishments and rewards 
may not emerge for East Asians.
Overview
To test these propositions, we directly compared patterns of 
reward and punishment between and within North Americans 
and East Asians. We investigated behavioral and psycho-
logical responses to honesty and deception in five exp eri-
ments with a scenario (Experiments 1-4) or a behavioral 
game (Experiment 5) that involved either an honest or decep-
tive partner whose actions monetarily affected the participants. 
Adapting Wang et al.’s (2009) methodology, the exp eriments 
equated outcomes of the deceptive and honest acts and costs 
to punish and reward in three ways: (a) deception hurt as 
much as honesty helped,2 (b) participants could not compare 
their payoffs to their counterparts’, and (c) costs to punish and 
reward were symmetric.
Experiment 1 established culturally divergent patterns 
of reward and punishment with Americans and East Asians. 
Experiment 2 replicated the findings by comparing the reward 
and punishment decisions of Americans and East Asians 
residing in the United States (a more socially mobile context) 
with East Asians residing in China (a less socially mobile 
context). It sought to provide preliminary support for our social 
mobility argument by testing whether East Asians residing in 
the United States rewarded and punished in a manner similar 
to that of Americans but different from that of East Asians 
residing in China. Experiment 3 directly tested the social 
mobility hypothesis by exploring how different psychologi-
cal experiences of mobility among Americans affected reward 
and punishment decisions. Next, we examined how mecha-
nisms related to social mobility—approach–avoidance behav-
ioral tendencies (Experiment 4) and trust and felt obligation 
(Experiment 5)—lead to disparate reward and punishment 
decisions within the two cultures. 
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 120 MBA stu-
dents who responded to a scenario as part of a class exercise. 
The American sample included 49 students (15 females and 
34 males), the Singaporean Chinese sample included 33 stu-
dents (14 females and 19 males), and the Taiwanese sample 
included 38 students (16 females and 22 males).3 The design 
was a 2 (behavior: deception, honesty) × 3 (culture: Ameri-
can, Singaporean Chinese, Taiwanese) between-participants 
design.
Procedure. Following Wang et al.’s (2009) procedures, par-
ticipants read about someone who behaved dishonestly or 
honestly, with gains equivalent to losses. The dishonest con-
dition read: “You and Pat recently completed a business 
deal; you have just discovered that Pat was dishonest about 
some key information. As a result, you only received $100. 
You would have received 50% more if Pat had been honest.” 
Thus, in the dishonest condition, participants expected $150 
and received a $50 loss. In the honest condition, participants 
received $100 because Pat was honest; they expected $50 
and received a $50 gain.
Respondents could then spend hypothetical money to 
reward (in the honest condition) or punish (in the dishonest 
condition) Pat at a cost. We introduced a cost to see if recipi-
ents would reciprocate at their own monetary expense (e.g., 
Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). The cost was set at one tenth 
of the reward or punishment amount as established in past 
exp eriments (e.g., Brandts & Charness, 2003; Wang et al., 
2009). Punishment and reward amounts and their costs were 
presented on 11-point scales from $0 to $100, in $10 incre-
ments. For example, participants who punished $10 checked, 
“Punish the individual $10 (at a cost of $1).” Participants 
were told that they would not interact with Pat again after 
their decision. The dependent measure was the amount 
rewarded or punished. 
Cross-country controls. American and Singaporean Chinese 
participants received identical scenarios in English, a national 
language in both countries. The instructions, scenario, and 
questions were given to Taiwanese participants in both Eng-
lish and Chinese (back-translated by independent translators) 
to avoid misinterpretation.
To ensure that Taiwanese participants understood the mon-
etary stake in terms of their own currency, the U.S. dollar 
amount was also presented in an equivalent amount of New 
Taiwan dollars (NT), based on the approximate exchange 
rate. For example, the end of the dishonest scenario stated, 
“As a result, you only received $100 (approximately NT$3300). 
You would have received 50% more if Pat had given you 
honest information.” Singapore and the United States both 
use dollars as their currency, so we left the dollar amounts 
unchanged for ease of interpretation by the Singaporean 
Chinese participants.
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Results and Discussion
Gender covariate. We conducted all analyses in the experi-
ments with and without gender as a covariate. As the results 
did not significantly differ, the analyses reported did not include 
gender as a covariate.
Amount of reward and punishment. The amount of response 
was submitted to a Behavior × Culture between-participants 
ANOVA. A marginally significant main effect emerged for 
behavior, F(1, 114) = 3.66, p = .06, d = .39, with individuals 
rewarding (M = 55.31, SD = 33.38) more than punishing 
(M = 40.89, SD = 40.78). A significant interaction also 
emerged, F(1, 114) = 3.62, p = .03 (see Figure 1). Americans 
rewarded (M = 60.00, SD = 37.32) more than they punished 
(M = 23.00, SD = 34.81), t(114) = 3.51, p = .001, d = 1.03. 
This asymmetry did not occur with East Asians; rewards and 
punishments were equivalent for Taiwanese (rewards: M = 
49.33, SD = 27.89; punishments: M = 53.04, SD = 37.35), 
t(114) = .31, p = .76, and for Singaporean Chinese (rewards: 
M = 53.00, SD = 31.64; punishments: M = 46.92, SD = 
47.85), t(114) = .47, p = .64. The between-cultures analysis 
demonstrated that East Asians (Taiwanese and Singaporean 
Chinese; M = 50.83, SD = 40.87) punished more than Ameri-
cans did, t(114) = 2.63, p = .01, d = .74. Rewards did not 
differ between East Asians (M = 51.43, SD = 29.72) and 
Americans, t(114) = .96, p = .34.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that Americans rewarded more 
than they punished, but East Asians rewarded and punished 
in equivalent amounts. We also found partial support for our 
cross-cultural predictions: East Asians punished deception 
more than Americans did, but unexpectedly, rewards did not 
differ by culture.
Experiment 2
As the previous experiment examined East Asian partici-
pants residing in Asia, Experiment 2 sought to enhance the 
generalizability of the findings, recruiting Chinese participants 
residing in Hong Kong China and East Asian participants 
residing in the United States. Experiment 2 also aimed to offer 
support for the role of social mobility. As North America is 
considered a more socially mobile environment, we expect 
that East Asians residing in America, like their Caucasian 
counterparts, will choose to reward more than they punish. 
However, we expect that East Asians residing in China will 
punish and reward equivalently. 
Method
Participants. Participants took part in the experiment as 
part of course requirement. The U.S. sample consisted of 113 
students (60 Caucasians and 53 East Asians4) from a U.S. 
university; the East Asian sample consisted of 69 Chinese 
students from a Hong Kong university.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 
except for one change. In Experiment 1, East Asian partici-
pants may have viewed the partner as an outgroup member 
because of the foreign name used (Pat), thereby responding 
based on outgroup distinction (Brewer & Brown, 1998). 
Exp eriment 2 addressed this limitation by removing the name 
‘Pat’ from the scenarios (e.g., changing “You and Pat” to “You 
and another individual” in the scenarios). Scenarios were pro-
vided in English and were identical across cultures because 
students in Hong Kong are competent in English and both 
Hong Kong and the United States use dollars as currency.
Results and Discussion
We first compared two ethnic populations that resided within 
the United States using a 2 (behavior: deception, honesty) × 2 
(ethnicity: East Asian, Caucasian) between-participants design. 
A main effect emerged for behavior, F(1, 109) = 12.35, p = 
.001, d = .70, with both Caucasians and East Asians residing 
in the United States rewarding (M = 65.85, SD = 26.05) more 
than punishing (M = 44.17, SD = 35.86). No other significant 
effects emerged.
Because no differences emerged between East Asians and 
Caucasians residing in the United States, we collapsed the two 
populations and compared their responses with the responses 
of East Asians residing in China in a 2 (behavior: deception, 
honesty) × 2 (country: United States, China) between-participants 
design. A significant Behavior × Country interaction emerged, 
F(1, 178) = 4.63, p < .05. Participants residing in the United 
States rewarded (M = 65.85, SD = 26.05) more than they pun-
ished (M = 44.17, SD = 35.86), t(178) = 3.36, p = .001, d = .70. 
The amount of reward (M = 51.18, SD = 34.53) and punish-
ment (M = 52.00, SD = 41.29) for those residing in China did 
not significantly differ, t(178) = .10, p = .92. Chinese residents 
punished more than U.S. residents did, but the difference was 
not statistically significant, t(178) = 1.08, p = .28, whereas 
Chinese residents rewarded less than U.S. residents, t(178) = 
1.95, p = .05, d = .48 (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Effect of behavior and culture on amount of response 
(means ± standard error of the mean), Experiment 1
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Experiment 2 lent support for the argument that social 
mobility drives reward and punishment decisions: Partici-
pants residing in the United States, regardless of their ethnic 
background (Caucasians or East Asians), rewarded more 
than they punished; those residing in China rewarded and 
punished in equivalent amounts. We also found partial sup-
port for our cross-cultural predictions: East Asians punished 
more (but not significantly more), but rewarded less than 
Americans did.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 directly tested the relation between social mobil-
ity and rewards and punishments. We predicted that partici-
pants who view themselves as more mobile will reward more 
than they punish (i.e., the pattern seen in Americans); how-
ever, those who view themselves as less mobile will reward 
and punish in equivalent amounts (i.e., the pattern seen in 
East Asians). Moreover, we expect participants who view 
themselves as more mobile to reward more and punish less 
than those who view themselves as less mobile.
Method
Participants and procedure. Participants were 51 U.S. Cau-
casian undergraduate students (20 males and 31 females). 
The stimuli remained the same as Experiment 2 except that 
following the scenario, individuals answered five questions 
about their perceived level of social mobility (see also Schug 
et al., 2009; adapted from Yuki et al., 2007). In response to 
the question, “How much does the following statement accu-
rately describe the people in your immediate social environment 
(your school, workplace, neighborhood, etc.)?” participants 
indicated their degree of agreement (1 = strongly disagree to 
7 = strongly agree) to statements such as, “It is uncommon 
for these people to have a conversation with people they 
have never met before” (α = .73). The five items were reverse 
coded and averaged, with a higher number reflecting higher 
levels of perceived social mobility.
Results and Discussion
We ran a linear regression, with perceived social mobility 
(mean centered) and behavior as independent variables. As 
expected, a main effect emerged for behavior, β = 21.05, 
SE = 9.44, t(50) = 2.23, p < .05, with Americans rewarding 
more than punishing. A significant Behavior × Mobility 
interaction emerged, β = 25.18, SE = 10.10, t(50) = 2.50, p < 
.05. Simple slopes analyses that examined this effect at 1 SD 
above and below the mean perceived social mobility score 
revealed that participants with high perceived mobility rewarded 
more than they punished, β = 22.41, SE = 6.70, t(50) = 3.34, 
p < .01, but those low in perceived mobility rewarded and 
punished in equivalent amounts, β = –1.35, SE = 6.71, t(50) = 
.20, p = .84 (see Figure 3). In addition, following an honest 
act, as perceived mobility increased, the amount of reward 
marginally increased, β = 13.00, SE = 6.96, t(50) = 1.87, p < 
.07; following a deceptive act, as perceived mobility increased, 
the amount of punishment marginally decreased, β = –12.18, 
SE = 7.32, t(50) = 1.67, p = .10. 
Individuals within the same culture may have their own 
experienced reality of social mobility. Whereas Experiment 2 
found that East Asians residing in the United States reward 
and punish in a way that is similar to Americans, Experiment 3 
showed that Americans who perceive themselves as experi-
encing lower social mobility respond in a way that is similar 
to East Asians. By directly tapping into individuals’ percep-
tion of social mobility, Experiment 3 provides more direct 
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Figure 2. Effect of behavior and country on amount of response 
(means ± standard error of the mean), Experiment 2
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Figure 3. Effect of behavior and perceived social mobility on 
amount of response, Experiment 3
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support that in more mobile environments, individuals will 
reward more than punish; in less mobile environments, indi-
viduals reward and punish in equivalent amounts. This seems 
to be driven by a decrease in punishment and an increase in 
reward as mobility increases.
Experiment 4
The findings in the previous experiments that Americans 
reward more than they punish, whereas East Asians do not 
differ, are in stark contrast to the literature that broadly dem-
onstrates that negatives are more powerful than positives 
(Baumeister et al., 2001). For example, actors who behave 
negatively, compared to those who behave positively, arouse 
stronger evaluative responses (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). 
The classic perspective, which suggests that social percep-
tion is inexorably tied to behavior (James, 1890), would pre-
dict that stronger negative perceptions about an actor lead to 
stronger negative behaviors toward that actor. However, the 
previous experiments suggest that behavior is not negatively 
valenced; that is, individuals do not punish more than they 
reward. 
One explanation for a divergence in rewards and punish-
ments by culture is that evolutionarily, nature may shape our 
psyche to be more perceptually vigilant toward negative actors, 
but cultural forces may play a part in remolding our behav-
ioral responses toward them (Baumeister et al., 2001). Bau-
meister and his colleagues (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007) 
have argued along these lines, suggesting that the ability to 
focus on negative phenomena that may undermine survival 
is more evolutionarily beneficial than the ability to focus on 
surrounding cues that pose no peril. Apart from this percep-
tual orientation to attend to negative stimuli, however, they 
argue that cultural systems also serve an evolutionary pur-
pose of regulating individuals’ behavior (i.e., via norms) in a 
manner that is deemed appropriate in that cultural environ-
ment. Therefore, whereas we have an inherent readiness to 
detect improper phenomena for the benefit of the human spe-
cies, culture serves to guide how to behave in reaction to these 
phenomena by invoking relevant cultural norms. In short, the 
negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001) may be more con-
sistent with evaluation than with behavior, with characteris-
tics of the surrounding culture (e.g., the level of social mobility) 
playing a role in shaping individual behavior, potentially 
enc ouraging more positive behavioral responses than would 
have otherwise not occurred. 
In Experiment 4, we hypothesize that both American and 
East Asian cultures will evaluate deceptive actors more neg-
atively than honest actors positively. For Americans, even 
though they view deceptive actors more negatively than they 
view honest actors positively (Wang et al., 2009), they may 
still punish less than reward, as their social mobility allows 
them to avoid and approach actors easily; they will therefore 
exhibit greater approach tendencies toward honest actors and 
avoidance tendencies toward dishonest actors. As a result, if 
approach–avoidance motivations are stronger in North Amer-
ica, evaluations made by Americans may predict approach–
avoidance motivations more than reward and punishment 
amounts. In other words, the more negatively (positively) a 
deceptive (honest) actor is viewed, the stronger the motiva-
tion to avoid (approach). In contrast, the evaluative–behavioral 
asymmetry may not be as prominent for East Asians. As 
supported by Experiments 2 and 3, East Asians experi-
ence more limited social mobility and therefore may punish 
and reward in a fashion that is more in line with their evalu-
ations. Thus, for East Asians, evaluations might be more 
closely tied to reward and punishment amounts than to 
approach–avoidance motivations.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 126 undergradu-
ates who responded to a scenario as part of course credit. The 
Singaporean Chinese sample consisted of 65 students (37 
females and 28 males). The Caucasian American sample con-
sisted of 61 students (37 females and 24 males). We used a 2 
(behavior: deception, honesty) × 2 (culture: Caucasian Amer-
ican, Singaporean Chinese) × 2 (measure: evaluation, behav-
ior) factorial, within-participants design on the third factor. 
The scenario and procedure are the same as those used in 
Experiment 2.
Dependent measures. In addition to the amount of punish-
ment and reward, participants evaluated their coworker on 
four 100-point scales (e.g., following deception: unfair; fol-
lowing honesty: fair). For example, in the deception condi-
tion, participants read: “Indicate how unfair you perceive the 
individual to be” and rated on a scale between 0 (least unfair) 
and 100 (most unfair)” (Wang et al., 2009). The scales were 
averaged (honesty condition: α = .87; deception condition: 
α = .71), with higher numbers representing more extreme 
evaluations: more negative in the deception condition and 
more positive in the honesty condition. Participants also 
exp ressed their approach–avoidance motivations toward the 
actor following honesty (approach: “I would like to spend 
time with this individual”) or deception (avoidance: “I would 
not like to spend time with this individual”) on a 1 (extremely 
disagree) to 10 (extremely agree) scale. The order of the psy-
chological and behavioral measures was counterbalanced.
Results and Discussion
The order of dependent variables did not affect the results, so 
we collapsed across this factor.
Amount of reward and punishment. A significant Behavior × 
Culture interaction emerged, F(1, 122) = 6.82, p < .05. Amer-
icans rewarded (M = 62.00, SD = 33.05) more than they pun-
ished (M = 40.96, SD = 38.93), t(122) = 2.39, p < .05, d = .59. 
The amount of reward (M = 48.15, SD = 30.91) and punishment 
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(M = 59.25, SD = 34.85) for Singaporean Chinese did not 
significantly differ, t(122) = 1.28, p = .20. Moreover, Singa-
porean Chinese punished more, t(122) = 2.02, p < .05, d = 
.50, but rewarded marginally less than Americans did, t(122) = 
1.65, p = .10.
Evaluations. Only a significant main effect for evaluations 
emerged, F(1, 122) = 13.93, p < .001, d = .69. As expected, 
regardless of culture, participants judged deceptive actors 
more negatively (M = 82.03, SD = 11.66) than they judged 
honest actors positively (M = 70.49, SD = 21.65).
Evaluative–behavioral pattern. We ran a Behavior × Culture × 
Measure (evaluation, behavior) mixed-model ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the third factor. Figure 4 depicts the 
significant Behavior × Culture × Measure interaction, F(1, 
122) = 9.12, p < .01. With Americans, a significant Behavior × 
Measure interaction emerged, F(1, 59) = 13.84, p < .001; 
they rewarded more than they punished, but their evaluations 
revealed the reverse pattern, with more negative judgment 
toward deceptive actors (M = 81.94, SD = 14.36) than posi-
tive judgment toward honest actors (M = 67.08, SD = 26.45), 
t(59) = 3.84, p < .05, d = .73. Thus, replicating results from 
Wang et al. (2009), Americans exhibited stronger evaluative 
reactions toward deception but stronger behavioral intentions 
toward honesty. For Singaporean Chinese, the Behavior × 
Measure interaction was not significant, F(1, 63) = .07, p = 
.80, suggesting that an evaluative–behavioral asymmetry did 
not occur. 
Approach–avoidance behavioral motivation. Next, we explored 
the level of approach–avoidance motivation by behavior and 
culture. The Behavior × Culture interaction was not signifi-
cant, F(1, 122) = 1.29, p = .26; however, two main effects 
emerged. Americans (M = 6.51, SD = 2.99) expressed a 
greater desire to avoid deceivers and approach truth tellers 
than East Asians did (M = 4.46, SD = 1.85), F(1, 122) = 
20.86, p < .001, d = .85. Overall, participants wanted to avoid 
dishonest actors (M = 6.14, SD = 3.02) more than they 
wanted to approach honest actors (M = 4.87, SD = 2.18), 
F(1, 122) = 6.39, p < .05, d = .49.
We also tested how evaluations were associated with 
approach–avoidance behavioral motivations and amount of 
reward and punishment within each culture. As predicted, 
the evaluations (positive and negative collapsed) of the actor 
made by Americans were correlated with behavioral motiva-
tions (approach and avoidance collapsed), r(61) = .44, p < 
.001, but not with amount of reward and punishment, r(61) = 
.10, p = .43. However, the evaluations of the actor made by 
East Asians were correlated with amount of reward and 
punishment, r(65) = .26, p < .05, but not with approach–
avoidance motivations, r(65) = .06, p = .61. This suggests 
that with greater mobility, individuals may more easily approach 
or avoid actors they deem to be positive or negative.
These findings demonstrate that even when the underly-
ing psychological responses between cultures are similar, 
with negative evaluations outweighing positive ones, reward 
and punishment behaviors do not necessarily follow the 
same pattern. An evaluative–behavioral divergence emerged 
for Americans, who punished deception less than they rewarded 
honesty, even though they evaluated dishonest actors more 
negatively than they evaluated honest actors positively. This 
divergence did not occur for Singaporean Chinese, who dis-
played similar evaluative responses as Americans but pun-
ished and rewarded in equivalent amounts. 
Our results suggest that Americans may have punished 
less than they rewarded because of their ability to avoid 
deceivers and approach honest actors. Moreover, the stron-
ger link between evaluations of the actors and the approach–
avoidance behavioral motivations toward these actors among 
Americans provides additional support for the social mobil-
ity argument.
Experiment 5
Experiment 5 goes beyond the hypothetical nature of 
the previous four experiments by using a new methodology 
with real monetary consequences. Moreover, this experiment 
exp lored how two psychological constructs related to social 
mobility, trust and felt obligation, affected reward and pun-
ishment behaviors.
In terms of reward decisions, we hypothesize that cross-
cultural differences in trust toward an honest actor explain 
why Americans tend to reward more than East Asians do. 
To test this hypothesis, we propose a two-stage model in 
which the partner’s behavior (deception or honesty) directly 
moderates the relation between culture, trust, and rewards 
(see Figure 5A). We suggest that the link between culture 
and trust (Stage 1) and the link between trust and response 
(Stage 2) depend on whether the initiating act is deceptive 
or honest. Stage 1 proposes that Americans will trust an 
honest actor more than East Asians will (Wike & Holzwart, 
2008; Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998; Yamagishi & 
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Yamagishi, 1994), but Americans and East Asians will not 
differ in their level of trust for a dishonest actor. Stage 2 
proposes that increased trust will predict reward, but 
decreased trust will not predict punishment (Wang et al., 
2009). Overall, this two-stage model suggests that trust medi-
ates the relation between culture and reward when the actor 
behaves honestly: Americans reward more than East Asians 
do because they perceive individuals who have acted honestly 
to be more trustworthy; however, trust is not expected to 
mediate the relation between culture and punishment.
In addition, we propose a two-stage felt obligation and 
punishment model, in which the partner’s behavior (decep-
tive or honest) moderates the relation between culture and 
obligation, and in turn, obligation predicts response (rewards 
or punishments; see Figure 5B). In line with past research 
(Wang, 2007), Stage 1 proposes that East Asians will feel 
more obligated to respond to a dishonest actor than Ameri-
cans will; however, East Asians and Americans will not dif-
fer in how obligated they feel to respond to an honest actor. 
In turn, Stage 2 proposes that the more obligated individuals 
feel to respond, the more they will choose to reward or pun-
ish. This hypothesis is supported by a plethora of evidence 
that ties felt obligation to both positive and negative reci-
procity, with feelings of obligation driving the reciprocation 
of gifts, favors, and help (Cialdini, 1984; Eisenberger, 
Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986; Pillutla, Malhotra, & 
Murnighan, 2003; Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968), as 
well as workplace deviance and revenge (Colbert, Mount, 
Harter, Witt, & Barrick, 2004; Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, 
& Rohdieck, 2004).
In sum, the present experiment directly tested how culture 
differentially influences perceptions of trust and felt obliga-
tion, which may play a respective role in reward and punish-
ment decisions. We expect that perceptions of trustworthiness 
will mediate the relation between culture and rewards, whereas 
felt obligation will mediate the relation between culture and 
punishments.
Method
Participants and design. Seventy-three undergraduate stu-
dents responded for monetary payment. Participants received 
$5 for participating plus any money accumulated in the 
experiment. The North American sample consisted of 39 stu-
dents (28 females and 11 males) and the Singaporean Chinese 
sample consisted of 34 students (16 females and 18 males). The 
design was a 2 (behavior: deception, honesty) × 2 (culture: 
American, Singaporean Chinese) between-participants design.
Procedures. Using the procedure by Wang et al. (2009), 
participants were informed that they would be matched with 
another participant from their session, with whom they would 
interact over a computer and never physically meet. We told 
all participants that their partner was randomly assigned to 
the role of Player A and they were randomly assigned to the 
role of Player B; however, Player A actually did not exist. In 
Stage 1, “Player A” could ostensibly send participants an 
accurate or an inaccurate message that would read either: 
“Option A earns you more than Option B” or “Option B 
earns you more than Option A.” All participants received the 
first message, “Option A earns you more than Option B” and 
subsequently chose between Options A and B. Participants 
then received feedback about whether the message was hon-
est or deceptive, with final payoffs held constant in all condi-
tions at $4.
In the honesty condition, participants who chose Option 
A were told (suggesting that they believed the message): 
“We can now reveal that the true message was: Option A will 
earn you more than Option B. Because you chose Option A, 
you receive $4 in Stage 1. You would have received 50% 
less if you had chosen Option B.” Participants who chose 
Option B (suggesting that they did not believe the message) 
saw a different ending: “Because you chose Option B, you 
receive $4 in Stage 1. You would have received 50% more if 
you had chosen Option A.”
In the deception condition, participants who chose Option 
A were told: “. . . the true message was: Option B will earn 
you more than Option A. . . . You would have received 50% 
more if you had chosen Option B.” Participants who chose 
Option B (i.e., those who did not believe the message) saw 
the same message with a different ending: “We can now 
reveal that the true message was: Option B will earn you more 
than Option A. Because you chose Option B, you receive $4 
in Stage 1. You would have received 50% less if you had 
chosen Option A.”5
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In Stage 2, participants could use their $4 payoff to reward 
or punish. Their costs were one tenth of the amount they would 
reward or punish their counterpart (same as the previous 
experiments). After making their reward or punishment choice, 
participants filled out a set of demographic questions. All par-
ticipants received $9 minus their reward or punishment cost.
Dependent variables. In addition to the amount of reward 
and punishment, the dependent measures included measures 
of trust (e.g., “I consider the other player to be” 1 = com-
pletely untrustworthy to 7 = completely trustworthy; α = .88; 
four items from Wang et al., 2009) and felt obligation (e.g., 
“After you found out the information about the other player’s 
choice did you feel:” 1 = not at all obligated to respond to 
7 = extremely obligated to respond; Wang, 2007). Higher 
numbers reflecting higher trustworthiness and felt obligation.
Results and Discussion
Amount of reward and punishment. The Behavior × Culture 
ANOVA yielded a main effect for behavior, F(1, 69) = 5.53, 
p < .05, d = .57, with individuals rewarding (M = 2.27, SD = 
1.50) more than punishing (M = 1.37, SD = 1.66). This main 
effect was qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 69) = 
5.15, p < .05. In line with previous experiments, Americans 
rewarded (M = 2.59, SD = 1.47) more than they punished 
(M = .91, SD = 1.60), t(69) = 3.06, p < .01, d = 1.09, whereas 
Singaporean Chinese rewarded (M = 1.85, SD = 1.63) and 
punished (M = 1.82, SD = 1.63) at approximately similar 
amounts, t(69) = .06, p = .96. A cross-cultural comparison 
demonstrated that Singaporean Chinese punished marginally 
more (M = 1.82, SD = 1.63 vs. M = .91, SD = 1.60), t(69) = 
1.74, p = .08, d = .56, but rewarded less than Americans did 
(M = 1.85, SD = 1.63 vs. M = 2.59, SD = 1.47), t(69) = 1.98, 
p = .05, d = .48. 
Trustworthiness and reward. A significant main effect indi-
cated that respondents viewed honest actors (M = 5.00, SD = 
1.17) as more trustworthy than dishonest actors (M = 2.99, 
SD = .93), F(1, 69) = 70.54, p < .001, d = 1.91. Moreover, 
Americans (M = 4.42, SD = 1.53) perceived actors as more 
trustworthy than Singaporean Chinese did (M = 3.67, SD = 
1.30), F(1, 69) = 6.35, p = .01, d = .53. These main effects 
were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 69) = 8.80, 
p < .01. Singaporean Chinese (M = 4.29, SD = 1.19) viewed 
an honest actor as less trustworthy than Americans did (M = 
5.56, SD = .83), t(69) = 4.00, p < .001, d = 1.23. The level of 
trust for a dishonest actor did not differ between Singaporean 
Chinese (M = 3.04, SD = 1.11) and Americans (M = 2.94, 
SD = .74), t(69) < 1, ns.
We predicted that trust would mediate the link between 
culture and amount of response, with the effect of culture on 
trust and the effect of trust on the amount of reward or pun-
ishment response moderated by the partner’s honest or dis-
honest behavior. Using the framework outlined by Preacher, 
Rucker, and Hayes (2007; SPSS macro), we tested for medi-
ation using a series of linear regressions (see Table 1). The 
first regression (Stage 1), with trust as the dependent variable, 
reconfirms a significant interaction between culture and behav-
ior (β = –1.37, SE = .46, p < .01). The second regression 
(Stage 2) demonstrates a significant interaction between 
trust and behavior (β = 1.24, SE = .36, p < .001), suggesting 
that the effect of trust on amount of response is moderated by 
behavior. 
To confirm that trust mediates the effect of culture on 
amount of response during honesty but not deception, bootstrap 
Table 1. Summary of Linear Regression Results (Experiment 5)
Dependent variables
Trust model Trust (Stage 1) Response (Stage 2)
Constant -1.13 (0.24) 0.43 (1.34)
Culture
 Western (ref.); East Asian 0.10 (0.34) 1.00 (0.49)*
Partner’s behavior
 Deception (ref.); honesty 2.62 (0.32)*** 2.07 (0.66)**
Culture × Behavior -1.37 (0.46)** -1.26 (0.74)†
Trust -0.86 (0.27)**
Trust × Behavior 1.24 (0.36)***
Felt obligation model Felt obligation (Stage 1) Response (Stage 2)
Constant 1.95 (0.35) 0.42 (0.35)
Culture
 Western (ref.); East Asian -0.36 (0.53) 0.39 (0.48)
Partner’s behavior
 Deception (ref.); honesty 0.89 (0.53)† 1.27 (0.45)**
Culture × Behavior -1.47 (0.77)† -0.96 (0.66)
Felt obligation 0.47 (0.10)***
The entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
†p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.
1538  Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36(11)
confidence intervals for this conditional indirect effect were 
obtained. We used a bootstrap procedure with 5,000 boot-
strap samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002), first setting the value 
of the moderator at 1 (mediation during honesty). The analy-
sis yielded a bootstrap 95% bias-corrected interval of [–8.45, 
–1.32], suggesting trust mediated the link between culture 
and response following honesty. When the value of the mod-
erator was 0 (mediation during deception), it yielded a boot-
strap 95% bias-corrected interval of [–1.19, .113], suggesting 
that following deception the same mediation did not occur 
(see Figure 5A for the simple paths and effects with behavior 
as the moderating variable).
Felt obligation and punishment. Felt obligation was analyzed 
in a between-participants ANOVA: The Behavior × Culture 
interaction was marginally significant, F(1, 69) = 3.37, p = 
.06. Singaporean Chinese felt more obligated to punish decep-
tion (M = 3.82, SD = 1.63) than did Americans (M = 2.71, 
SD = 1.82), t(69) = 2.00, p < .05, d = .64, but felt as obligated 
to reward (M = 3.29, SD = 1.54) as Americans did (M = 3.59, 
SD = 1.59), t(69) = .68, p = .50.
We predicted that felt obligation would mediate the link 
between culture and amount of response, with the effect of 
culture on felt obligation moderated by the partner’s behav-
ior. Similar to the trust model, we estimated the coefficients 
of this model (see Table 1). Stage 1 reconfirms a marginally 
significant interaction between culture and behavior, with 
felt obligation as the dependent variable (β = –1.47, SE = .77, 
p = .06). The second regression (Stage 2) demonstrates that 
greater felt obligation predicts greater reward or punishment 
(β = .47, SE = .10, p < .001).
An analysis with the value of the moderator set at 0 (medi-
ation during deception) yielded an interval of [.05, 1.21], 
suggesting that felt obligation mediated the link between cul-
ture and punishment. When the moderator was set at 1 (medi-
ation during honesty), an interval of [–.71, .24] was obtained, 
suggesting that the same mediation did not occur. Figure 5B 
outlines the simple paths and effects with behavior as the 
moderating variable.
Using a different methodology, Experiment 5 replicated 
results from the previous four experiments. Moreover, the 
results support the theoretical argument that cultural differ-
ences in trust toward general others and felt obligation to 
punish that are implicated by different levels of social mobil-
ity can engender divergent reward and punishment behaviors 
by East Asians and Americans.
General Discussion
The results across five experiments, using different method-
ologies and cultures, show an interesting culturally divergent 
pattern of rewards and punishments: Americans reward more 
than they punish, but East Asians reward and punish in equal 
amounts. Experiments 2 and 3 tested the role of social mobil-
ity on reward and punishment. Experiment 2 showed that East 
Asians residing in North America displayed reward and pun-
ishment responses that resembled their American counter-
parts. Experiment 3 revealed that Americans with lower 
per ceived mobility responded more like East Asians (i.e., 
rewarding and punishing equivalently), but those with higher 
perceived mobility, like Americans (i.e., rewarded more than 
they punished). 
Experiment 4 extended the within-culture results found in 
the prior three experiments and showed that Americans dis-
play evaluative–behavioral divergence, with more extreme 
negative evaluations toward deception but more extreme 
positive behavioral intentions toward honesty; for Singapor-
ean Chinese, this evaluative–behavioral divergence did not 
emerge. Furthermore, Experiment 4 provided additional sup-
port for the social mobility argument—its findings showed 
that stronger evaluations trigger greater approach and avoid-
ance behavioral motivations (afforded by high-mobility situ-
ations) for Americans and greater reward and punishment 
behavior (encouraged in low-mobility situations) for East 
Asians. Finally, drawing from previous research, Experiment 5 
examined two psychological responses associated with mobil-
ity, trust and felt obligation, and found that they mediate the 
relation between culture and reward and punishment deci-
sions, respectively. 
Across all studies, a consistent cross-cultural pattern 
emerged in which Americans rewarded more and punished 
less than East Asians did. Indeed, a meta-analysis that tested 
the overall effect sizes across the five studies (Table 2) showed 
that these effects were reliable and lent additional support that 
social mobility plays a significant role in our findings. 
Reward and Punishment as Culturally  
Adaptive Social Control Strategies
To our knowledge, the current research is the first empirical 
attempt to situate reward and punishment behaviors in the 
cultural–ecological context of social mobility. The present 
article demonstrates a promising first step toward examining 
how different situational constraints may give rise to dispa-
rate reward and punishment patterns. Reward and punish-
ment are culturally adaptive social control strategies that 
have emerged with or responded to different cultural envi-
ronments (Campbell, 1990). For example, with lower social 
mobility, the cultural environment in East Asia is more likely 
to afford mutual monitoring to regulate individuals’ behav-
ior within a close-knit network. According to the institutional 
approach proposed by Yamagishi, Hashimoto, and Schug 
(2008), people’s behaviors are guided by incentives. To put 
it differently, behaviors are strategies people use to secure the 
incentives. As some strategies are more ecologically rational 
or socially wise than others (i.e., some strategies are better 
means to achieve the incentives), they will, over time, evolve 
to become the default strategies (Yamagishi & Suzuki, 2009). 
For instance, social avoidance, as opposed to confrontational 
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provision of punishment, may be a more adaptive strategy to 
achieve social regulation in the United State given its looser 
and more mobile socioecological conditions. For Americans, 
avoiding dishonest actors may then become their ecologi-
cally wise strategy to regulate social behaviors.
If we consider the notion that reward and punishment are 
culturally adaptive social control strategies, it is reasonable 
to predict that with changes in the socioecological context 
or the culture-sustaining institution (Cohen, 2001; Yamagishi 
& Takahashi, 1994), a different mode of social control will 
emerge. For example, Suzuki and Yamagishi (2004) found 
that Japanese participants placed in an experimentally simu-
lated judicial system that resembles the one used in the 
United States were more likely to display cognitive tenden-
cies characteristic of Americans (e.g., they tended to per-
ceive themselves as independent, prefer uniqueness, and 
attend to focal objects) than those placed in a simulated 
social control system where mutual monitoring is dominant. 
This is consistent with our Experiment 2 findings that East 
Asians, after residing in or being acculturated into North 
America, appear to resemble their American counterparts in 
rewarding honest partners more than punishing deceptive 
partners. Taken together, our results support the contention 
that reward and punishment behaviors are functional strate-
gies adapted to the sociocultural ecology to promote opti-
mal collective benefits.
Cross-Cultural Implications
Understanding how individuals use reward and punishment 
as social control mechanisms is increasingly relevant given 
that unethical behaviors may in part contribute to or emerge 
from global economic turmoil. This subject may also be vital 
for organizations that employ increasingly international work-
forces. Specifically, managers might be able to improve group 
dynamics and organizational performance if they understand 
how incentives and punishments affect coworkers from dif-
ferent cultural backgrounds. Given that there are different 
social motives guiding different societies (e.g., more vs. less 
socially mobile societies), punishments and rewards may be 
more or less acceptable and prominent in some societies than 
others. 
Findings within domains such as childrearing (Kelley & 
Tseng, 1992) and conflict management (Friedman, Liu, Chen, 
& Chi, 2007) showed that individuals from East Asian cultures 
punish negative behavior more than those from North Amer-
ican cultures do. Our experiments also suggest this finding. 
As East Asians punish more than Americans do, they may 
also be more receptive to punishments as a form of deterrent, 
possibly because it can better ensure regulated social behav-
iors that contribute to social harmony—an important source 
of happiness in their culture (Christopher, 1999; Kitayama, 
Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000).
Future Research Directions
One-time versus multiple-time interaction designs. As the read-
ers may have noticed, the way the experiments were set up 
involved only a one-time interaction between the participants 
and their business partner or game player. Although we adopted 
Wang et al.’s (2009) experimental procedures to extend their 
study sample to East Asians, we also believe it will be inter-
esting for future research to empirically compare the one-
time versus multiple-time interaction designs. On one hand, 
with multiple interactions, it is conceivable that the cultur-
ally divergent patterns of reward and punishment may become 
accentuated as interactions with a fellow partner from the 
same culture could boost the saliency of cultural norms in 
guiding decisions to reward or punish (i.e., the American 
cultural norm to reward more than to punish, the East Asian 
cultural norm to reward and punish similarly; Zou et al., 
2009). On the other hand, it is plausible that sufficient mul-
tiple interactions with a partner may experimentally simulate 
a low-mobility environment such that it may induce Ameri-
cans to act like East Asians; they may reward as much as to 
punish so as to encourage positive acts and deter negative acts 
from a long-term interdependent partner (Denson, Lickel, 
Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006). Comparing the one-time 
versus multiple-time interaction designs in future research 
will illuminate these two opposing predictions. 
Promotion versus prevention regulatory motives. Highly rel-
evant to the present studies is the line of research on promo-
tion versus prevention regulatory focus. The control system 
in the United States tends to recognize the presence of posi-
tive behaviors; it emphasizes the recognition of positive acts 
and one’s accomplishments (i.e., ideals), which coincides 
well with a promotion goal. The control system in East Asia 
highlights the importance of preventing negative behaviors; 
Table 2. Meta-Analysis Summary
Effect size estimates (r) in Experiments 1-5 Summary
Hypothesis 1 2 3 4 5 M Z p 95% CI
Americans reward more than East Asians -.13 -.24 -.33 -.21 -.24 -.22 -3.55 < .001 -.34, -.10
Americans punish less than East Asians  .34  .10  .34  .24  .27  .22  3.51 < .001 .10, .35
N 120 182 51 126 73
M represents the weighted average of the effect sizes. Heterogeneity tests were not significant.
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it emphasizes minimal disruption to a collective by relying 
on people fulfilling obligations and social roles (i.e., oughts), 
which coincides well with a prevention goal. 
In addition, according to the regulatory fit theory (Higgins, 
2000, 2005), people simply may “feel right” when the goal 
attainment strategy sustains or fits with their regulatory state, 
thereby enhancing the value of what they are doing. When 
people experience value from fit, they may subsequently see 
the goal as more important, evaluate the goal more positively, 
and become more motivated to attain the goal (Cesario, Grant, 
& Higgins, 2004). Thus, as American cultures value promo-
tion goals and East Asian cultures value prevention goals 
(Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000), we posit that promotion-
focused Americans are more prone to feeling right when 
employing gain-promoting strategies (e.g., rewards) to ensure 
advancement and accomplishment, whereas prevention-
focused East Asians are more prone to feeling right when 
employing loss-avoidance strategies (e.g., punishments) to 
ensure vigilance (Higgins et al., 2001). Hence, it is reason-
able to argue that such a predominant eagerness, promotion-
oriented mind-set can transfer to a higher likelihood to reward 
honesty, and a predominant vigilance, prevention-oriented 
mind-set can transfer to a higher likelihood to punish dishon-
esty. Future studies can measure individual differences or situ-
ationally manipulate people’s regulatory orientation (e.g., Lee 
et al., 2000; Roese, Hur, & Pennington, 1999) to examine the 
effects of self-regulatory motives and value from strategic fit 
on reward and punishment behaviors. Ongoing research is 
now under way to examine these effects. 
Future research can also examine how the experienced 
constraint of social mobility joins forces with self-regulatory 
motives to affect reward and punishment behaviors. Recently, 
Gelfand and her colleagues (2008) showed in a 35-nation 
study that experiences with certain situational-ecological 
constraints and latitude (e.g., population density) pose influ-
ence on some psychological tendencies. Relevant to the 
present research are their findings that nations that experi-
ence accelerated constraints are more likely to develop 
stricter behavioral guides (i.e., a tighter culture) and to focus 
on preventing losses (vs. promoting gains). Although the 
current article examined how the constraint of social mobil-
ity is related to reward and punishment behaviors, it will 
be a fruitful research avenue to illuminate the intricate rela-
tion among mobility as a societal constraint, regulatory 
motives as a psychological mechanism, and reward and pun-
ishment as behavioral tendencies in a culture.
Conclusion
This research indicates that the dynamics of reward and pun-
ishment may not be mirror images of one another across dif-
ferent cultures. Rather, culture, coupled with the society’s 
level of social mobility or individual’s perceived reality of it, 
may ultimately encourage different behavioral choices. This 
line of research provides a distinct perspective on the “bad 
is greater than good” argument, taking it in a new direction 
that warrants greater theoretical reconceptualization. Con-
tinuing to chart these connections provides for an intrigu-
ing and timely line of research that has tremendous pot ential 
to illuminate on the cultural dynamics of rewards and 
punishments.
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Notes
1. Singapore is a Southeast Asian city-state with a Chinese ethnic 
majority.
2. This can be tested in two ways. First, deceptive or honest 
behaviors affected participants’ absolute outcomes equally; 
for example, people gained $50 from honesty or lost $50 from 
deception. Second, deception and honesty had equal relative 
effects on participants’ wealth (Thaler, 1980); for example, if 
participants expected $150 but received $100, deception may 
be viewed as causing a 33% loss; if they expected $50 but re-
ceived $100, honesty may be viewed as providing a 100% gain. 
To equalize relative change, participants expected to receive $75 
rather than $50 in a relative honesty condition (but still received 
$100). Because past research found no differences between re-
actions to both absolute and relative honesty (Wang, Galinsky, 
& Murninghan, 2009), only the absolute honesty condition was 
included across all five experiments.
3. We used Taiwanese and Singaporean Chinese as the East Asian 
populations because a majority of their ancestors originated from 
China. 
4. East Asian Americans were individuals of East Asian descent 
(e.g., Chinese, Korean) residing in the United States where 
the data were collected. In all, 32.3% self-reported as East 
Asian/East Asian American, 29.4% Chinese/Chinese American, 
20.6% Southeast Asian American, and 13.2% Korean/Korean 
American. 
5. No significant main effect or interaction emerged as a function 
of participants believing the other player (all Fs < 2.5).
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